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Introduction 
Imagine that you have just signed a contract to work as the Assistant Controller at 
AeroTechAZ Corp., a multinational technology corporation that has experienced tremendous 
growth in the last couple of years, outpacing all of their industry competitors by a margin of 2:1 
in terms of gross profit. The company has just published its financial statements and the 
company’s performance has shattered investment analyst expectations for the eighth year in a 
row, raising the stock price on the New York Stock Exchange from $670 to an all-time high of 
$680. According to the contract you signed your total compensation includes a starting base 
salary of $182,000, full company covered health insurance of your choice, stock options, 
retirement benefits, and the potential for bonus compensation should short-term target goals be 
met, as set out by the company’s chief executive officer. After every year of service, you will 
receive an average of 42,628 of time-vested stock that will be available for purchase after two 
more subsequent years of service. If you received all 42,628 shares and the company’s share 
price remained the same for the next two years, the total value of those shares would be 
$28,987,040. Thrilled about this opportunity, you begin your job at the company feeling a 
constant rush of euphoria as you enter your glass office space on the top floor of your company’s 
New York City headquarters.  
 A month passes since you have started your new position at the company when you hear 
some talk among some employees in the accounting department about questionable journal 
entries being entered into the system. While utilizing the company’s accounting system, you 
discover that there is a large quantity of questionable journal entries that you cannot explain. 
After further investigation, which you carry out in secret for the next month, you find that there 
are many other accounts that have altered numbers. Doing a quick estimate, you realize that the 
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questionable journal entries are material in nature and would greatly impact your company’s 
financial statements and it would have to restate them. In fact, instead of exceptional growth for 
the past couple of years, your company has been experiencing turbulent times and actually 
experienced a loss in the past two fiscal years.  
To prepare for your next meeting with the company’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) you 
compile your report as usual, but you also gather the evidence you have discovered about the 
questionable journal entries that, to you, appear to have a material impact on the company’s 
financial statements. During your meeting with the CFO you inquire about the supposed rumors 
pertaining to dubious accounting entries being made, being careful not to reveal that you have 
full knowledge about the various material misstatements. The CFO responds nonchalantly and 
jokes that you should not rely on the ramblings of the “common workers.” Despite the CFO’s 
attitude toward the rest of the employees, you bring forward the evidence of the accounting 
anomalies at the company, emphasizing that there are also deficiencies in some of the internal 
controls if these entries could be entered. After several minutes, the CFO looks up and states that 
the concern will be brought up with the external auditors as well as the company’s legal counsel. 
The CFO also states that as soon as any findings come from either the external auditors or the 
legal counsel you will be informed. 
A week goes by and you receive an email from the CFO asking to see you as soon as 
possible. You hurriedly grab the evidence you had gathered and go to meet the CFO. After 
exchanging pleasantries, the CFO begins to explain that, while your report may state 
“inefficiencies in internal controls and accounting anomalies that are of a material nature,” the 
external auditors and company legal counsel have determined that the accounting methods used 
followed Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and that this was “just how the 
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company did its accounting.” The CFO also mentions that the matter should be dropped and that 
you should not look into the matter any further, hinting that to do so would be a waste of 
company resources. After you leave this meeting you decide to look over your findings and the 
more you analyze the financial statements and accounts, the more certain you are that there is 
some type of fraud occurring at the company. Torn between your responsibilities to report fraud 
and your loyalty to your company you decide to use the company’s employee fraud hotline to 
report the fraud as well as file a report with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As 
you finish the calls you wonder, did you feel you made the right decision? 
 Another month goes by and you have not heard anything about an investigation into the 
accounting anomalies. You enter your office on the final Friday of your fourth month at the 
company and you notice that many of your co-workers are avoiding you and talking in hushed 
whispers as you pass them on your way to your office. You check your email and notice that you 
have received an email from the company’s human resources and legal department. Hoping that 
this is the email stating that the fraud had been investigated, you open it only to find that you 
have been terminated “effective immediately.” Stunned, you sit in your office chair staring at 
your computer screen when the CFO and two security officers of the company walk into your 
office. The CFO notifies you that you have 30 minutes to leave the premises. You quickly gather 
your belongings, stow them in your vehicle, and drive home.  
Your surprise quickly turns into anger and you start to wonder why you were fired, 
especially with such short notice. You speculate that you were fired due to reporting fraud at the 
company using the hotline or that the company was alerted by the SEC about allegations of the 
possible fraud and the CFO realized that the whistleblower was you. You know that your 
termination from the company for providing information as a whistleblower is against the law. In 
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hopes that you will receive some type of compensation, as well as help with your future job 
prospects, you decide to sue the company for violation of the anti-retaliation policies under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 806. However, after months of legal battles your case is 
dismissed by the Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Your 
former employer has finally won. 
This narrative is an example of what some employees in the workforce may experience 
during their lifetimes, regardless of their occupation or background, in a publicly traded 
company. Activities involving whistleblowing can range from These illegal activities can range 
from discrimination against job candidates based on criteria such as race or sexual orientation to 
instances of fraud which could include acts such financial statement fraud. There are also two 
types of whistleblowers, those who report internally within their respective organization and 
those who report externally to an outside organization.  
This thesis will provide a background for whistleblower protection policies and explore 
the evolution of whistleblower protection policies in the United States in relation to publicly 
traded companies. Also, this thesis will analyze how, while initially these policies themselves did 
not help many whistleblowers, over time many whistleblowers have won legal battles, creating a 
precedent for greater recognition and greater protection of the whistleblowers. 
Background 
Over the past few decades, government regulators have attempted to protect those 
individuals who have blown the whistle on their organizations to help promote ethical behaviors. 
These whistleblower protection policies affect both employees of federal, state, and local 
governments as well as those in publicly traded companies. This thesis will review five pieces of 
government regulation that affects the sale of securities of public companies, both at the time of 
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an initial public offering and after the fact, as well as laws that regulate public companies. These 
laws include the following: The Securities Act of 1933, The Securities Act of 1934, the Private 
Securities Legislation Reform Act, enacted in 1995, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, hereafter 
referred to as the Sox Act of 2002, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010, hereafter referred to the as the Dodd-Frank Act. While the Securities Act 
of 1933 and Securities Act of 1934 established the guidelines for securities trading for the initial 
public offering of a public company’s securities as well as the regulations following the initial 
public offering, the Private Securities Legislation Reform Act sought to limit the amount of 
frivolous lawsuits brought against companies. 
However, in response to the accounting scandals that occurred in the early and late 2000s, 
Congress enacted the SOX Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act, in an effort to curb unethical 
accounting standards and elevated levels of risky behavior by companies. While, on the whole, 
all the aforementioned Acts sought to provide the public with a greater sense of security, the 
SOX Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act both provide specific provisions to whistleblowers. 
However, as noted in the aforementioned narrative, the whistleblower does not always win.  
Next, there will be an examination of published academic literature that explains why 
whistleblowers are afraid to blow the whistle. Sherron Watkins, the former Vice President of 
Enron, and Cynthia Cooper, former Vice President of Internal Audit at WorldCom, will be used 
as examples of how a whistleblower is viewed during and after their act of whistleblowing. This 
thesis will also cover the evolution of the legal system’s understanding of the types of 
protections that are afforded to whistleblowers at publicly traded companies. To illustrate the 
evolution of the courts’ understanding of whistleblower protection policies, four legal cases, as 
well as their ultimate outcomes, will be analyzed.  
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The first case, Menendez v. Halliburton Inc., involved Anthony Menendez, the former 
Director of Technical Accounting Research and Training at Halliburton Inc. bringing up a 
whistleblower retaliation case against his employer, Halliburton Inc., a multinational corporation 
that “…is one of the world's largest providers of products and services to the energy industry” 
(Halliburton, n.d.). The second case, Lawson et al. v FMR LLC et at. involves Jacqueline 
Lawson, a former “…employee of Fidelity Brokerage Services, a subsidiary of FMR” (Mooney 
& Bull, n.d.) and Jonathan Zang, a former employee of “Fidelity Management & Research Co. 
and later for a subsidiary called FMR Co., Inc. (collectively, the “Fidelity Management 
companies”)” (Mooney & Bull, n.d.) who filed lawsuits citing that they had been retaliated 
against for raising concerns over the company’s accounting methods (Mooney & Bull, n.d.).  
The third case, Julio Perez v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc. involves Julio Perez, the 
former Senior Manager of Pharmaceutical Chemistry at Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc., who 
was terminated from his position due to his accusation that upper management was falsifying 
clinical testing results on a developing drug. The final case involves Monsanto Company and its 
unnamed whistleblower who, after bringing forward information to the SEC about “…alleged 
accounting violations related to the company’s trademark weedkiller…” (Rubenfeld, 2016), was 
awarded the second biggest whistleblower retaliation claim payout in American history, totaling 
$22.5 million. Finally, there will be a discussion of how the courts power over statutory law can 
have an impact on whistleblowers. 
Government Regulation 
Ethics, corporate governance, compliance, risk assessment, and litigation are all words 
that do not just have an integral part in the legal system, but also in the world of accounting. Any 
business or organization should maintain and encourage an environment based on ethical 
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decision making. This ethical behavior involves, not only a culture that punishes fraudulent acts, 
but also extends to subjects such as sexual harassment, onboarding practices, anti-retaliation 
policies for employees. The most difficult part about curbing unethical business practices and 
promoting ethical behaviors is developing effective internal controls within an organization 
while also ensuring top management sets an ethical tone-at-the-top. In the United States, the 
government hasl several statues that also seek to promote ethical behavior by providing 
protection to employees both employed by the government and publicly traded companies.  
According to Fraud Magazine, “whistle-blowing, as it relates to fraud, is the act of 
reporting fraud, waste, and abuse. Reporting any act of wrongdoing is considered whistle-
blowing, regardless if it’s reported by a public or private employee or to persons inside or 
outside of the victim organization” (Patrick, 2010). As mentioned previously, whistleblowers can 
report these types of illegal acts both internally or externally and the United States government, 
over the years, has attempted to provide greater protections to whistleblower, in part, by 
encouraging ethical behavior. The government and organizations have encouraged 
whistleblowing activities by providing anti-retaliation legislation as well as by providing other 
monetary incentives to those whistleblowers whose cases are proven valid. However, scholars 
point out that government regulations, in some cases, benefit the companies who are retaliating 
against the whistleblowers rather than protecting them. Furthermore, it can also be said that the 
legal system has, in some cases, sought to limit the rights of whistleblowers.  
 Even though the United States government and professional organizations both try to 
encourage ethical behavior at organizations, the real world remains a far cry from an ethical 
paradise. As the accounting scandals of the early 2000s and the market collapse that started in 
2007 show, there was and still is much work to be done in the way of ethical behavior in 
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corporate America. Two of the reoccurring motives for disregarding ethical behavior in favor of 
behaviors that disregard ethical decision making are either top management’s own personal gain 
from a company’s improved performance, or meeting Wall Street analyst expectations. While 
there have been whistleblowers who have attempted to report the wrongdoing at a company and 
have succeeded, there are far more of those within the past decade since the SOX Act of 2002 
and the Dodd-Frank Act who have not been validated. These whistleblowers face, not only the 
possibility of retaliation from their place of employment, but also industry-wide backlash that 
can result in long-term economic ruin.  
The Securities Act of 1933 & the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
 One of the original acts to protect investors from unscrupulous companies was the 
Securities Act of 1933. This Act came as a response to two major historical events, the stock 
market crash of 1929 and the fraud perpetrated by Ivar Kreugar. As pointed out in Paul 
Clikeman’s Called to Account: Financial Frauds that Shaped the Accounting Profession, 
Kreugar, a Swedish born businessman, who created a business empire centered on the production 
of matches during the mid-1910s to the early 1930s that eventually grew to where he was able 
“…to obtain absolute monopolies in 15 countries and dominate the match market in 19 others” 
(2013, p. 25). Ultimately, investors, both in Europe and in the United States, lost millions of 
dollars due to the fraud with investors in the United States having “…. held more than $250 
million of securities issued by Kreuger’s companies” (p. 35).  
Until the Securities Act of 1933, the sale of securities was not regulated at a federal level, 
rather, the sale of securities was regulated on a state-by-state basis in the United States 
(Investopedia, n.d.). According to Clikeman, “the 1933 Act…was modeled loosely on the British 
Companies Act” (p. 36) and requires any company that sells securities to provide investors with 
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reliable financial information that is free of intentional misrepresentations or other instances of 
fraud. Even with the objections from those in the audit profession, Congress saw the 
implementation of this Act to further prevent fraud and provide greater assurance to the public. 
However, the law still gave public accounting firms and their auditors the ultimate power to audit 
a company’s financial statements. 
While the Securities Act of 1933 sought to help provide greater assurance to investors for 
the initial public offering of a company’s securities, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was 
primarily focused on after the initial public offering of a company. The Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which was, and still is, a 
federal agency that enforces government regulation regarding the sales of a company’s 
securities. According to Investopedia, the SEC: 
has the power and responsibility to lead investigations into potential violations of the 
SEA such as insider trading, selling unregistered stocks, stealing customers' funds, 
manipulating market prices, disclosing false financial information or breaching broker-
customer integrity. Also, the SEC enforces corporate reporting by all companies with 
more than $10 million in assets and whose shares are held by more than 500 owners. The 
SEC can choose to file a case in federal court or settle the matter outside of trial (n.d.). 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also required companies to register their securities on a 
listed stock exchange, properly disclose their securities on their financial statements, and meet 
financial reporting framework requirements (Investopedia, n.d.). This Act also protected 
investors from insider trading to help further guarantee that no one has an unfair advantage in the 
market place. However, as is the case with government statues, future pieces of legislation as 
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well as the interpretation by the court system would dictate the impact these laws would 
ultimately have. 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
 During the late 1980s and into the beginning of the 1990s, the accounting industry faced 
a crisis from mounting lawsuits from all sides. In fact, in April of 1992, “…U.S. accounting 
firms faced 6,000 liability suits seeking more than $15 billion in damages” (Clikeman, p. 176). 
In response to the volume of securities lawsuits that threatened the accounting industry, Congress 
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The law focused on reducing the number of 
frivolous lawsuits, specifically class action lawsuits, by establishing, “…immunity from liability 
for financial projections and other forward-looking statements, and eliminate[ing] joint and 
several liability under certain circumstances” (Coppolo, 2002). Also, those seeking reparations 
must now prove that the company being sued knew about the misrepresentation of the 
information, either by intentional manipulation or omission, it gave to investors. 
The law also lays out specific provisions that affect the public accounting industry. To 
improve the provisions that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 placed into law, section 301 of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 set forward additional considerations for the 
audits conducted by public accountants. Per section 301 public accountants are required to 
design their audits to provide reasonable assurance that a company’s financial statements are 
presented fairly, to discover related party transactions that have a material effect on the 
company’s financial statements, and to determine if the company has a problem as a going 
concern (1995, p. 26). Also, public accountants were also tasked with informing a client’s top 
management of any instances of material fraud and, if no action was taken by the company’s 
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management considering the fraud, then the public accountants had a responsibility to report the 
fraud to the SEC (p. 27). 
 The law also had two, possibly unintended, consequences. The first consequence is that 
plaintiffs now had a higher burden of proof when it comes to successfully bringing forward a 
lawsuit. According to the Act: 
…relating to whether a member or members of the purported plaintiff class is the most 
adequate plaintiff may be conducted by a plaintiff only if the plaintiff first demonstrates a 
reasonable basis for a finding that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable 
of adequately representing the class” (p. 9).  
This meant that the plaintiff must prove that there was adequate base for the lawsuit without the 
aid of the discovery process during normal legal proceedings. As a byproduct of the first 
consequence, whistleblowers and their activities were also possibly adversely affected. Thus, the 
second consequence was a limitation on the ability of whistleblowers to bring forward possible 
lawsuits against their employers, should they be retaliated against due to the restraint on the 
discovery process.  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 Section 406, and 806 
 Two of the largest and most well-known accounting scandals of the early 2000s involved 
both Enron and WorldCom. In the case of Enron, the accounting scandal cost investors about 
$74 billion and, in the case of WorldCom, investors lost a total of $180 billion (Accounting 
Degree Review, n.d.). In response to these accounting scandals, Congress passed the SOX Act of 
2002, which is named after Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and Representative Michael G. Oxley 
(R-OH) who spearheaded the legislation in their respective parts of Congress. Per the law, the 
purpose of the SOX Act of 2002 is “…to protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
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reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes” 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2002, p.1). The SOX Act accomplished this goal, at least in part, 
by establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), requiring greater 
auditor independence, holding the company to a higher standard of corporate responsibility, 
enhancing financial disclosures, defining certain occasions of a conflict of interest, increasing 
corporate and criminal fraud accountability, and requiring the chief executive officer of a public 
corporation to sign off on the company’s tax return (2002). Two of the SOX Act’s most 
important sections, regarding ethics and whistleblowers, are section 406 and section 806. 
Section 406 of the SOX Act, now requires companies to have a code of ethics or disclose 
the reasons why they do not have a code of ethics for both their senior financial officers as well 
as a general employee code of ethics. This code of ethics would be “…applicable to its principal 
financial officer and comptroller or principal accounting officer, or persons performing similar 
functions” (p. 45-46). This meant that corporate executives, in theory, would be specifically 
tasked with setting an ethical tone at the top, one in which the company would value ethical 
behavior more than mere financial gain. While section 406 focused on top financial management 
at a company, section 806 empowered the everyday employee.  
Under Section 806 of the SOX Act, employees of publicly traded companies are 
protected against retaliation from their employers if they provide evidence of the perpetration of 
fraud (p. 59). However, if an employee, who works at a publicly traded company, is terminated 
from their position after providing evidence “…a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, 
any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal 
law relating to fraud against shareholders…” (p. 59), then he or she can bring their complaint to 
the Secretary of Labor or an appropriate court which has jurisdiction over the matter. 
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Furthermore, the claim must be brought forward within 90 days of the incident and, should the 
claimant’s assertion found to be true, then the claimant can receive compensation. The 
compensation available to whistleblowers who were retaliated against included the following:  
… “(A) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee would have had, 
but for the discrimination; ‘‘(B) the amount of back pay, with interest; and ‘‘(C) 
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, 
including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees (. 60). 
However, as mentioned before, legislation is only part of the battle against unethical 
behavior. Even with the SOX Act, it would only take half a decade until the United States faced 
another fiscal crisis and would institute yet another piece of legislation aimed at financial reform. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010   
By late 2007 a housing bubble, a moment where speculation on the housing market 
exceeded the actual demand of the market (Investopedia, n.d.), totaling about $8 trillion, burst 
and launched the United States economy into a downward spiral, resulting in a nationwide 
economic slowdown (Economic Policy Institute, n.d.). The great Recession, as it would be 
named, lasted a total of 18 months, ending in June of 2009 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2010). In response to the market collapse, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, more commonly referred to as the Dodd-
Frank Act, was signed into law on July 21, 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act’s (2010) purpose was “to 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency 
in the financial system, to end ‘‘too big to fail’’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes” 
(p. 1). 
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 While mainly focused on financial reforms on Wall Street and protecting the everyday 
consumer, the bill also expanded upon the whistleblower protection policies in the SOX Act. In 
section 748 of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), the Commodity Exchange Act was updated and 
defined a whistleblower as “…any individual, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly, who 
provides information relating to a violation of this Act to the Commission, in a manner 
established by rule or regulation by the Commission” (p. 1). Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 continued to expand upon the protections set forth under the SOX Act by listing out 
specific actions that constituted as retaliation by an employer. The Dodd-Frank Act specifically 
states: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or 
in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower (p. 369) 
Also, those seeking legal action against their employers for wrongful termination due to blowing 
the whistle on the company may bring their cases directly to a United States District Court. The 
U.S. District Court would most likely be the one in which the incident occurred. However, the 
rights of a whistleblower to bring a case forward are not indefinite. The Dodd-Frank Act also 
limits the amount of time between an incident where an employee is retaliated against for 
performing a whistleblowing activity and when they file a claim. The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) 
specifically states that “an action under this subsection may not be brought more than 2 years 
after the date on which the violation reported in subparagraph (A) is committed.” (p. 369) 
 The Dodd-Frank Act further expanded the compensation that a whistleblower could 
receive under the SOX Act of 2002, possibly in recognition of the outcomes of previous 
whistleblower cases. A whistleblower, who is successful in their claim, may now receive “(A) 
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not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed 
in the action or related actions; and (B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been 
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions” (p. 467). However, 
as will be shown below, even with federal regulations protecting whistleblowers, employer 
retaliation still occurs and many employees remain silent. 
 To blow or not to blow the whistle, that is the question 
 Every day, billions of people make decisions based on the objective and subjective 
consequences of the options they have at hand. Examples of everyday decisions that have 
consequences can be as simple as deciding what to eat for dinner or whether to stay up late to 
watch a television show they enjoy. Likewise, ethical decisions are made on an everyday basis as 
well. Deciding to blow or not to blow the whistle is just one ethical dilemma that an employee 
can encounter. However, just as there are times when a person might take the higher more ethical 
road, there are possibly an equal amount of opportunities for fraud to be perpetrated.  
In fact, the potential of fraud is a reality that every corporation or organization must face, 
regardless if it wants to or not. In fact, as noted by Colin Parcher, CFE, former director and 
president of the Vancouver Canada Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) Chapter, 
“a simple Google search of Work Place Fraud gets 98 million hits in 0.37 seconds likewise a 
Google search of Employee Theft nets 26 million hits in 0.19 seconds…” (2012, p. 2), which 
potentially displays how often employees and companies are looking to prevent fraud within 
their organization. Furthermore, according to the ACFE’s Report to the Nations on Occupational 
Fraud and Abuse 2014 Global Fraud Study, “the median loss caused by the frauds in our study 
was $145,000. Additionally, 22% of the cases involved losses of at least $1 million” 
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2014, p. 4). Even more disheartening is the fact that, 
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according to the same report, “the median duration - the amount of time from when the fraud 
commenced until it was detected - for the fraud cases reported to us was 18 months” (2014 p. 4). 
However, the report did offer some good news to business professionals. “Tips are 
consistently and by far the most common detection method…[and] over 40% of all cases were 
detected by a tip — more than twice the rate of any other detection method. Employees 
accounted for nearly half of all tips that led to the discovery of fraud” (p. 4). This shows that, tip 
lines are not only an effective way to combat fraud, but that employees are taking actions to help 
protect the ethical integrity of the organization. The report also notes that companies can take 
preventative measures by setting up other internal controls, besides tip lines, to prevent and 
detect fraud as well as improve other areas of corporate governance throughout the organization 
(p. 4-5). 
One simple question remains though, why would a person want to blow the whistle? 
Dungan, Waytz, and Young in their article The Psychology of the Whistleblower set out to 
answer this question. The authors state that “…the decision to blow the whistle rests on the 
tradeoff that people make between fairness and loyalty” (2015, p. 1) and that those who endorsed 
fairness more often than loyalty were more willing to blow the whistle, while conversely those 
who endorsed loyalty were more likely not to blow the whistle (p. 1). Other factors that 
determined the likelihood of not blowing the whistle included the time they were employed at 
their current company, their total levels of compensation, the level of their education, and their 
gender as well as whether a person was introverted or extroverted, or those who feel they have a 
greater locus of control (2015, p. 2). However, the authors also state that organizational culture 
and parameters of the situation affect the likelihood of whistleblowing (2015, p. 3). 
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However, unlike the conclusions of Dungan, Waytz, and Young, some researchers have 
found contradictory results. For example, Near, “a professor at the Kelley School of Business at 
Indiana University who has studied whistleblowing since 1980” (Melnick, 2014) found that the 
determining factor in whether an employee reports a violation or not is the severity of the 
situation at hand rather than a personal morality or psychology (Melnick, 2014). This means that 
even if a person is more psychologically groomed to not interfere with a certain situation, if the 
situation is dire, then one might expect that the individual might intervene in some way, such as 
through blowing the whistle.  
Others still have found a middle ground between those of Dungan, Waytz, Young, and 
Near, including both personal and situational factors. Michael McMillan, CFA, director of Ethics 
and Professional Standards at CFA Institute, agrees with Dungan, Waytz, and Young in the sense 
that one’s personal morality and sense of right or wrong plays an integral part in the decision to 
blow the whistle or not. However, unlike Dungan, Waytz, and Young, McMillan sees the act of 
whistleblowing as “…the ultimate manifestation of employee loyalty to the organization 
[because] loyalty in this context, does not mean allegiance to top management; instead whistle-
blowers are acting in the best ethical interests of their organization, the public, clients, or capital 
markets” (2012). Like Near, McMillan also states that individuals do consider the situational 
factors, such as the severity of the wrongdoing, however, he also notes that one’s own personal 
life circumstances, such as emotional and financial stability, also do factor into the ultimate 
decision (2012). 
A major environmental factor that also affects an individual’s decision includes the 
organization’s tone at the top. “An organization’s leadership creates the tone at the top – an 
ethical (or unethical) atmosphere in the workplace. Management’s tone has a trickle-down effect 
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on employees” (Mahadeo, 2006, p. 44). The corporate culture that a person on the outside of a 
company might observe could be entirely different than the inner culture. For example, as many 
have noted, Enron’s top executives perpetuated a culture focused on a high-school mentality of 
dangerous behavior and risk-taking, defining this term as “guys with spikes” (Gibney, 2005). As 
mentioned previously, when employees fear retaliation from either their supervisors or co-
workers they are less likely to report fraud (Ethics & Compliance, 2013). Another key 
component to tone at the top is rewarding whistleblowers and punishing those who are found 
responsible. Without these two main components, many employees will be not be as inclined to 
actually report fraud. 
Why are whistleblowers afraid to blow the whistle? 
Still, another question arises when discussing whistleblowing. Why are employees afraid 
to blow the whistle, especially since there are laws that protect them? To answer this question, 
one could turn to the fates of former Vice President of Enron, Sherron Watkins, or former Vice 
President of Internal Audit at WorldCom, Cynthia Cooper for further explanation.  
Sherron Watkins, Enron’s Whistleblower 
The names of Enron executives and its auditor, Arthur Andersen, are often associated 
with terms such as unethical behavior, corporate greed, and a corrupt tone at the top. The main 
perpetrators of the Enron fraud near the time of Enron’s collapse involved Kenneth (Ken) Lay, 
Enron’s chairman of the board, Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s chief executive officer, and Andrew 
(Andy) Fastow, Enron’s chief financial officer. These top Enron executives created a culture 
focused on giving off the appearance to the public that Enron was an unstoppable force and 
would only keep turning a profit while engaging in reckless behavior that ignored ethical 
guidelines.  
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However, the blame does not fall only on the failings of these few Enron executives. 
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, and, in part, Enron’s legal counsel, Vinson and Elkins, are 
both to blame for, at certain times, colluding with Enron’s top management to promote an 
unethical business culture and to commit fraud, such as in the case of Sherron Watkins, a Vice 
President at Enron prior to its collapse. While Watkins’ actions may not appear to be that of a 
normal whistleblower, her letter to Ken lay and her testimony before Congress has earned her the 
title of a whistleblower from both Congress and the public. 
Sherron Watkins began her career in public accounting after receiving her bachelors in 
business administration from the University of Texas at Austin in 1982 (Federal News Services, 
2002). Her first position as a public accountant was at Arthur Andersen, where she worked in 
both the Houston and New York offices until 1990 when she transitioned into a career as a 
portfolio manager for MG Trade Finance’s commodity-backed finance assets group (Federal 
News Services, 2002). During this time Watkins, earned her certified public accountants license 
as well as received her masters in professional accounting from the University of Texas at Austin 
(Federal News Services, 2002). Watkins worked for MG Trade Finance until October of 1993 
when she was directly hired by Andrew Fastow, “…to manage Enron's newly-formed 
partnership with CALPERS, the California Public Employee Retirement System. The partnership 
was the Joint Energy Development Investments Limited Partnership, or JEDI… [and she] held 
the JEDI management portfolio position until the end of 1996” (Federal News Services, 2002). 
During her time at Enron, Watkins held a variety of positions, all the while moving up the 
chain of command to become a vice president at Enron. After her position as part of the JEDI 
management portfolio unit, Watkins moved to Enron International with a focus on acquiring new 
energy assets globally, then to Enron’s broadband unit, and, finally, to assisting in corporate 
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development projects directly under the direction of Andrew Fastow until her eventual 
resignation. As mentioned in her testimony before the Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Watkins explained that during a 
review of the market and book values of sales assets she discovered that Enron had engaged in 
business with Raptor, an entity owned by a company called LJM, which was, in turn, owned by 
Andrew Fastow, her direct boss. 
After further investigation, Watkins determined that “the Raptor hedges were locking in 
supposedly sales value that Enron had on equity investments that it had made” (Federal News 
Services, 2002). This meant that Enron was recording agreed-upon value for certain assets that 
were bought from Raptor, even though they should have been recorded on Enron’s books at 
current market values. Eventually Watkins realized that Enron would ultimately take an 
economic loss from the investment due to Raptor’s inability to pay off the pre-determined price.
 Like other whistleblowers before her, and since then, Watkins feared for her continued 
employment at the company saying. “I was not comfortable confronting…Mr. Fastow with my 
concerns. To do so, I believe, would have been a job- terminating move.” (Federal News 
Services, 2002). When questioned as to why she had not gone to Jeff Skilling about the Raptor 
accounting, Watkins stated that “…Mr. Skilling was fully aware of them [the improper 
accounting methods]. He is a very hands-on manager. I had also heard rumors that people… had 
complained to him and he had done nothing. So I really felt it was fruitless to go to Mr. Skilling” 
In August of 2001, Watkins sent an anonymous letter, “…in response to a request for 
questions for an upcoming all-employee meeting to be held August 16th, to address Mr. 
Skilling's departure.” A few days after sending the letter, and after talking to Cindy Olson, 
Enron’s Vice President of Human Resources (Federal News Services, 2002), Watkins decided to 
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try to meet with Ken Lay to discuss her findings. During her meeting with Lay, Watkins 
explained that the economic loss from the Raptor investment would total $700 million and that 
she also wanted to transfer to a different department. Watkins found Fastow’s relationship to 
Raptor in violation with accounting policies and Lay reassured Watkins that he would investigate 
the matter (Federal News Services, 2002). 
Eventually, Fastow would discover that Watkins had both written a letter and met with 
Ken Lay about her concerns. Fastow retaliated by attempting to seize Watkins computer as well 
as try to fire her. With the help of Olson, Watkins uploaded her findings onto a new computer, 
delete the files from her old computer, and comply with Fastow’s wishes without losing any of 
her information. Furthermore, the subcommittee found that Vinson and Elkins and Arthur 
Andersen both limited the scope of their investigations into Watkins’ claims, which explains why 
their investigation showed that Enron would not experience a loss from the Raptor deal (Federal 
News Service, 2002). 
One of the most interesting points of Watkins’ testimony was not necessarily her attempts 
at blowing the whistle, but was her defense of Ken Lay. As stated previously in this thesis, tone 
at the top is established by all top management, especially that of the board of directors and chief 
executive officer. The pressure to continuously meet analyst expectations, management’s 
actions, and executive management’s compensation are linked together by their nature. Watkins 
recalled that Enron was “… a very arrogant place with a feeling of invincibility. And I'm not 
certain people felt like it was that imminent. They just felt like Mr. Fastow, along with the 
accountants, would come up with some magic in the future” (Federal News Services, 2002). Her 
words, providing a slight insight to outside observers about what actually happened within the 
walls of Enron. However, Watkins seemed to have believed throughout her time working at 
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Enron that Lay was innocent. In fact, in a letter to Ken Lay dated October 30, 2001 she wrote, 
“the culprits are Skilling, Fastow, Glisson, Causey, as well as Arthur Andersen and Vinson & 
Elkins" (Federal News Services, 2002).  
Throughout her testimony and thereafter, Watkins was heralded as a whistleblower. In his 
closing remarks, Representative Billy Tauzin (R-LA), chairman of the Energy and Commerce 
Committee at the time, while not using the term itself, described Watkins as a whistleblower, 
immortalizing her as such to both the corporate world and the public eye. Tauzin stated:  
Ms. Watkins, your testimony stands for itself…And that is that your testimony, your 
activities in regard to Enron actually call upon, I think, all of us to examine the notion of 
corporate loyalty. There is some, I assume, who believe corporate loyalty is protecting 
the corporation against all harm, even when it's doing something wrong. You 
demonstrated for us a different definition of corporate loyalty, a different definition of 
fiduciary responsibility to a corporation. That includes responsibility to its shareholders 
and investors, and I want to compliment you for that…the notion that corporate loyalty 
means owning up to mistakes for the sake of the proper relationship to investors and 
consumers, and confronting them directly and reporting them and dealing with them 
forthrightly. (Federal News Services, 2002). 
Even today, Watkins is still remembered as the whistleblower who helped bring down Enron and 
rise to immediate fame. In the January/February 2007 issue of Fraud Magazine, Dick Carozza 
wrote, “Watkins was soon lauded as an “internal whistle-blower," brought before Congressional 
and Senate hearings to testify against her former bosses, and heralded by TIME magazine as a 
"Person of the Year," with WorldCom's Cynthia Cooper and the FBI's Coleen Rowley” (Carozza 
2007).  
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 However, while some continue to praise Watkins for her actions, she has also had her fair 
share of criticism. One criticism labels Watkins as an opportunist who used the situation to 
dodge the blame and lay it on others, noting “…that she sold Enron stock options worth $17,000 
shortly after talking to Ken Lay” (Curwen, 2003). Others have questioned her title as a 
whistleblower since, as one Forbes article points out, there is not much public information as to 
what Watkins did in the meantime directly following her meeting with Ken Lay other than wait 
for an answer (Ackmen, 2002). In the same year Watkins was named a TIME’s Person of the 
Year, but before Enron had permanently shut its doors, Frank Pellegrini, stated that Watkins was 
not truly a whistleblower. “In the news media, it is "Enron whistle-blower" Sherron Watkins, 
even though Watkins never really blew a whistle. A whistle-blower would have written that 
letter to the Houston Chronicle, and long before August” instead of just reporting internally” 
(Pellegrini, 2002).  
Strangely enough, if one were to search on Google, “who was the whistleblower of 
Enron,” the result comes up as, “Sherron Watkins, the plainspoken former vice president whom 
Congress anointed as a whistleblower after the company's collapse, repeated much of what she 
said then: Enron needed to come clean about potentially disastrous accounting tricks or face 
implosion” (Associated Press, 2006) with a link to an article from NBC News. This statement 
implies that Watkins is only labeled as a whistleblower because of Congress’s view of her, not 
necessarily because of her actions. In the end, whether she was a “true whistleblower” or not, she 
still received just as fierce of a backlash from the business world as other whistleblowers have in 
the past. 
 There is a reason why many people are afraid to blow the whistle. While the immediate 
retaliation from an employer is daunting in and of itself, the long-term impact on a person’s life 
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can be just as devastating to the whistleblower. In a 2004 interview with Deborah Solomon of 
the New York Times, Sherron Watkins shared a grim outlook for her own future in corporate 
America. While noting that she was doing a lecturing circuit and wrote a book, when asked if she 
would ever work at another company Watkins responded, “about the only corporation I can see 
hiring me is one that is in a meltdown situation and trying to revamp its reputation…When it 
comes down to the final decision, there's probably one or two people who say: ''Are y'all crazy? 
She's a whistle-blower” (Solomon, 2004).  
Watkins’s comment, not only speaks to the tone at the top at some companies and how 
they view those who have blown the whistle on a former employer, but also to some of the 
beliefs of those who work within corporate America. In the time immediately following 
Watkins’s testimony on Capitol Hill, she found that, while there were those who hailed her as a 
hero, those in her hometown of Houston did not necessarily share the same view. In an interview 
with Pamela Colloff of Texas Monthly, Watkins stated “I’m seen as a troublemaker by that elite 
group in Houston that’s being critiqued by everyone now…they blame me for spoiling all the 
fun” (Colloff, 2003).  
In another interview with Dr. Nance Lucas and Dr. V. Scott Koerwer for the Journal of 
Leadership and Organizational Studies, Watkins stated “whistle-blower is a word that generates 
a lot of negative feelings. There are people who view that term negatively and then there are 
those who view it heroically” (2004, p. 39). Years later in an interview with Fraud Magazine, 
when asked how people respond to her now, Watkins stated “people respond very favorably to 
me. I think most folks see themselves taking the same actions I did at Enron, if they found 
themselves in my shoes. And just in case they ever do need to follow in my footsteps, they sure 
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like hearing the story directly from me and hearing what I might have done differently, etc” 
(Carozza, 2007).  
Watkins would also appear in the documentary Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room 
and co-author the book Power Failure the Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron. Today, Watkins 
has moved onto a career in consulting, advising companies on matters of corporate governance 
issues, but she never returned to corporate America as an accounting executive (Associated 
Press, 2006). In fact, Watkins words about being a hero to some while a villain to others are later 
echoed by Dr. Bruce Shine who, in 2007, stated that Sherron Watkins “…while engaging in the 
occasional academic lecture, is without work in corporate America” (p. 230). 
In regards to her work after Enron, Watkins stated that her future did not involve 
reentering corporate America into the same type of position as when she had left. In fact, 
Watkins stated, “starting a leadership development program, collaborating with other leadership 
experts and executive coaching firms [in a] multi-month program, involving peer interaction 
along industry lines. The goal is to equip these leaders with a peer network and an experience 
that prepares them for anything, even the perfect storm that was Enron.” (Carozza, 2007).  
Cynthia Cooper, the WorldCom Whistleblower 
 Enron was not the only major fraud that occurred during the early 2000s. According to 
the Connecticut General Assembly, which compiled “…a list of the major corporate accounting 
scandals occurring between 2000 and 2005” (Sullivan, 2006), there were 26 different major 
accounting scandals. Of these 26 accounting scandals, WorldCom, Inc., which was one of the 
largest telecommunications companies operating within the United States during the early 2000s, 
crumbled quickly after the discovery of fraud within the company. After the fraud at WorldCom 
was uncovered, the Board of Directors of WorldCom, Inc., established a Special Investigative 
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Committee to investigate the fraud in its entirety. The Committee submitted a report to the SEC, 
dated March 31, 2003, that noted that the fraud itself “…was accomplished in a relatively 
mundane way: more than $9 billion in false or unsupported accounting entries were made in 
WorldCom’s financial systems in order to achieve desired reported financial results” (Special 
Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of WorldCom, Inc., 2003).  
In fact, as noted by a TIME’s Daniel Kadlec, the WorldCom fraud cost investors over 
$175 billion, “…nearly three times what was lost in the implosion of Enron” (Kadlec, 2002). 
Much like Enron, one of WorldCom Inc.’s top management was involved in the main 
whistleblowing act. However, unlike Enron’s Sherron Watkins, who was directly in charge of 
reviewing the Raptor accounts, this fraud was uncovered due to the hundreds of hours of work 
on the part of WorldCom’s internal audit department, specifically, the efforts of Cynthia Cooper, 
WorldCom’s Vice President of Internal Audit, and Gene Morse and Glyn Smith, two of Cooper’s 
most trusted internal auditors in her department.  
 Cynthia Cooper completed her undergraduate work in accounting at the Mississippi State 
University, her Master’s work at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa, and would began her 
professional public accounting career at Price Waterhouse before moving on to Deloitte, 
Haskins, and Sells (Cooper, 2008, p. 41-49). Eventually, Cooper would move onto WorldCom 
Inc. who, at the time, was the second largest telecommunications company in America. 
Although, as is often with long-term frauds, nothing was as rosy as it might have appeared on the 
surface. During the end of May of 2002 and into June of 2002, WorldCom’s internal audit 
department started to investigate an account that increased computer equipment by $500 million, 
using the description of “PREPAID CAPACITY” (p. 226-227)  
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As Cooper lays out in her book, Extraordinary Circumstances, the convoluted system of 
accounting that led the $500 million to be put in that account: 
It looks like the amount was moved from an asset account called “intercompany asset 
transfer clearing.” But the trail gets fuzzier from there. Gene thinks the amount in 
“intercompany” is coming from an account called “transmission equipment,” which 
represents amounts spent to build out WorldCom’s telecom network. But the amount in 
“transmission equipment” traces back to three separate line-cost expense accounts- 
payments to other telecom carriers to originate and terminate phone calls or lease fiber. 
(p. 227). 
To say that the roundabout accounting that the internal audit team had stumbled upon was 
confusing would be a gross understatement. However, the reasoning for the convoluted 
accounting soon became apparent. As Cooper soon found out, by “…moving [funds] from the 
income statement to the balance sheet… [it would] increase the company’s profit” (p. 227), 
which would then in turn increase financial analyst opinions of WorldCom. Eventually, Cooper, 
Morse, Smith, and the rest of the internal audit department would find more entries booked as 
“PREPAID CAPACITY.” Around mid-June of 2002, Cooper’s audit team found “…49 prepaid 
capacity accounting entries, totaling $3.8 billion, recorded over all four quarters in 2001 and the 
first quarter of 2002…some described as prepaid capacity, others labeled, simply, “SS entry.”” 
(259). 
After days of being stonewalled by top management, Cooper and Smith interviewed 
David Myers, the Controller of WorldCom as part of their investigation. Myers admitted that the 
company had been improperly capitalizing the line costs of the company’s leased fiber lines to 
allow the company’s total revenue to overtake the losses on the fiber lines since they were being 
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utilized in a limited way by customers. Soon after, WorldCom would face some serious 
consequences for its actions. On June 26, 2002, the SEC would file a civil fraud lawsuit against 
WorldCom in response to the company being forced to restate its previous year’s financial 
statements. No clearer representation of how the public responded to the news of the WorldCom 
fraud can be seen than through an analysis of the company’s stock price which was “…hitting a 
low of $0.09 before the [trading] halt” (p. 267). In the end, WorldCom was forced to pay $750 
million as a fine to the SEC, the largest accounting scandal fine at the time (BBC News, 2003).  
Like Sherron Watkins, Cynthia Cooper was not a whistleblower in the sense that she took 
the company’s problems to the public. Cooper sought to find an answer to her questions as 
thoroughly as she could while staying within the organization. However, one of the major 
differences between the two is that, after meeting with Ken Lay about the Raptor accounts, 
Watkins seemingly stopped trying to do anything more than she had already done. Cooper, on 
the other hand, worked tirelessly with her team to discover the extent of the potential fraud. In 
the end, after the public was informed of the fraud at WorldCom, Cooper quickly rose to public 
fame, being named one of Time Magazine’s 2002 persons of the year for her efforts. However, 
she did not survive the ordeal unscathed. Six years later, she would publish her book 
Extraordinary Circumstances.  
While Cooper’s tale of courage and ethics may seem indeed extraordinary, the result of 
her career in corporate America should not come as a surprise. While not totally severing ties 
from corporate America, today “Ms. Cooper is CEO of The CooperGroup, LLC, a management 
consulting firm that provides services in the areas of internal audit, ethics and compliance, fraud 
prevention and detection, board consultation and education and enterprise risk management” 
(Cooper Group LLC, n.d.). Also, Cooper provides services as a guest speaker at high schools and 
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universities as well as serving “…on advisory boards for Louisiana State University, Lehigh 
University and Mississippi State University” (Cooper Group LLC, n.d.). Other notable positions 
Cooper held include: being “…a member of the Standing Advisory Group of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board… [and], the 2011 Chairman of Board of Regents for the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners…” (“Biography,” n.d.).   
However, after becoming a whistleblower, Cooper found life difficult at times. “I was an 
ordinary citizen who, like most people, preferred a private life, but I had stepped over some 
“invisible line” and become a whistleblower. Though I didn’t know it at the time, whistleblowers 
often experience negative repercussions. I would quickly learn first-hand what that meant” (p. 
X). In fact, “…Cooper says she never felt like a hero. Just the opposite: in the aftermath of the 
disclosure of the fraud, with the press and lawyers and congressional investigators constantly on 
her trail, Cooper [was] seized by depression and anxiety” (Farrell, 2008). However, when asked 
in a 2008 question and answer interview with TIME, if she would still blow the whistle, even 
knowing all the struggles she went through, Cooper affirmed her stance, “yes, I would. I really 
found myself at a crossroads where there was only one right path to take” (Ripley, 2008).  
The fates of Watkins and Cooper provide a glimpse into the future of an employee 
thinking of blowing the whistle. On one hand, one could make a successful consulting career 
after it as well as feel good knowing he or she “did the right thing.” However, the initial 
economic and personal consequences could be quite detrimental to the average person. To blow 
the whistle on an organization is not just to defy the corporate culture of the company, but it is 
also an act of defiance against the corporate culture of the industry. For Sherron Watkins, it 
meant being called a hero and a villain at the same time. For Cynthia Cooper, like Watkins, it 
meant dealing with giving up a lifetime in the corporate world.  
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While Watkins’s and Cooper’s acts as whistleblowers were highly publicized and might 
provide hope for those thinking of blowing the whistle, some scholars have found that many still 
do not report wrongdoing in their organization and, if they did report the incident, they 
experienced retaliation from their employer. According to one study, “…65% of those who 
witness wrongdoing reported it; 22% of those who reported wrongdoing said they experienced 
retaliation (an increase of 46% from 2009): and 46% of those who observed wrongdoing but 
chose not to report it, cited fear of retaliation as the reason” (McMillan, 2012). Also, in a 2013 
study by the Ethics & Compliance Initiative, the rate of retaliation was 21 percent “… [and 
when] asked why they kept quiet about misconduct, more than one-third (34 percent) of those 
who declined to report said they feared payback from senior leadership. Thirty percent worried 
about retaliation from a supervisor, and 24 percent said their co-workers might react against 
them” (Ethics & Compliance Initiative, 2013). Thus, even when employees report unethical or 
fraudulent activities, many still fear being retaliated against either by their company or their co-
workers. 
Anthony Menendez v. Halliburton Inc. 
The legal system’s interpretation of statutory law has been a double-edged sword for 
whistleblowers, sometimes originally denying claimants before being ultimately overruled. This 
was the case for Anthony Menendez, Jonathan Zang, and Jacqueline Lawson. In regards to 
Anthony Menendez, Menendez became the Director of Technical Accounting Research and 
Training at Halliburton Inc. in 2005 and, after discovering accounting anomalies in the 
company’s revenue recognition practices, Menendez filed a report with the SEC and emailed the 
audit committee of Halliburton Inc. about his report to the SEC (Eisinger, 2015). Unbeknownst 
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to Menendez, his email to the audit committee was forwarded to Halliburton Inc.’s General 
Counsel and, after being notified that the SEC would be investigating due to a tip;  
…the General Counsel, having seen Menendez’s internal complaint, surmised that 
Menendez must have been the source of the SEC complaint as well. The General Counsel 
sent an email to Menendez’s boss and others, instructing them to preserve documents 
relevant to the SEC’s investigation, as directed, because “the SEC has opened an inquiry 
into the allegations of Mr. Menendez (ArentFox, 2014).   
This email would start a cascade of events that would ultimately lead to Menendez 
having some of his official duties taken away, being socially ostracized by colleagues, and he 
was excluded from meetings he had previously attended (Eisinger, 2015). Eventually Menendez 
would resign from his position, but not before filing a claim with the DOL’s OSHA stating that 
he had been retaliated against as described under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 section 806. 
(Eisinger, 2015). That same year, an Administrative Law Judge for the OSHA denied 
Menendez’s claim stating “…that Menendez failed to demonstrate that Halliburton subjected 
him to adverse action when it breached his confidentiality” (Administrative Review Board, 
2011).  
After six more years trying to appeal the Administrative Law Judge’s opinion, the 
Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board, in Anthony Menendez v. Halliburton, Inc., 
reversed the Administrative Law Judge’s opinion stating that there was sufficient evidence to 
support Menendez’s claim that he had been unfairly retaliated against under SOX section 806 
due to a breach in confidentiality (Administrative Review Board, 2011). Halliburton, would try 
to appeal the Administrative Review Board’s decision and the case would be brought up one 
final time in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2014 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would 
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side in favor of Menendez and stating that he should receive $30,000 as compensation for his 
troubles (Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2014) and all his legal fees were to be paid by 
Halliburton Inc. (Eisinger, 2015).  
While Menendez did eventually find a job as the “… controller for General Motors in 
Detroit,” (Wakelee-Lynch, 2015), it took him nearly a decade to win his whistleblower case. 
Even worse, those who were directly involved in retaliating against Menendez for his actions 
never faced any type of punishment. In fact, as noted by Eisinger; 
Many of the Halliburton and KPMG officials involved in the accounting issue or the 
retaliation have continued to prosper in the corporate ranks. One is now Halliburton’s 
chief accounting officer. McCollum [the chief accounting officer during Menendez’s 
tenure at Halliburton] is now the company’s executive vice president overseeing the 
integration of a major merger. The KPMG executive who disagreed with Menendez is 
now a partner at the accounting firm (2015) 
Menendez may have won the legal battle, but one may wonder if Halliburton Inc. still could be 
claimed as the true victor, monetary fine aside. 
Lawson et al. v FMR LLC et al. 
The second case, Lawson et al. v FMR LLC., like the Menendez case, involved retaliation 
by the employer against the employees.  In 2005, Jonathan M. Zang worked for Fidelity 
Investments and was terminated due to raising concerns over Fidelity fund statements that “…he 
believed violated federal securities laws” (Mooney & Bull, n.d.). Zang brought an anti-retaliation 
case to the Department of Labor’s Occupational Health & Safety Administration (OSHA) and 
then to an Administrative Law Judge, both of which denied his request, first for not being a 
protected action under the law and second because Zang was not an employee of a publicly 
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traded company and was instead a contractor for a private company (Mooney & Bull, n.d.). In 
2007, Jackie Lawson, a former employee of Fidelity Brokering Services LLC, filed a claim with 
the Department of Labor’s OSHA and the United States District Court of Massachusetts, citing 
that she had been constructively discharged after “…raising concerns about cost-accounting 
methods” (Mooney & Bull, n.d.).  
Like in the case of Zang, the court found that Lawson was not covered as a protected 
employee under the current understanding of the law since she too was a contracted employee 
for a private company. On March 4, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a six to 
three vote, decided that “…§1514A’s (SOX) whistleblower protection includes employees of a 
public company’s private contractors and subcontractors” (Supreme Court, 2013, p. 1-2). The 
legal understanding of what constituted as protected activities and what employees were 
protected under the SOX law were expanded with the Lawson et al. v. FMR LLC et al. case.  
Julio Perez v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
In Julio Perez v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which was filed in the United States 
District Court Southern District of New York, Julio Perez filed a whistleblower retaliation claim 
against Progenics Pharmaceuticals Inc. under the SOX Act of 2002. Perez was an employee of 
Progenics Pharmaceutical, Inc., where he acted as the Senior Manager of Pharmaceutical 
Chemistry. Before starting Pereze had to sign an agreement which: 
…required [the] Plaintiff [Perez] to preserve in confidence, and not to use, to publish, or 
to otherwise disclose…, either during or subsequent to [Perez’s] employment, without the 
written permission of Progenics, all confidential proprietary rights or any knowledge, . . . 
or any other confidential information of Progenics, its customers, or others from whom 
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Progenics has received information under obligations of confidence.’”  (Julio Perez v. 
Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2015).  
During Perez’s time as Senior Manager of Pharmaceutical Chemistry, he worked on the 
development of Relistor, a drug developed to help individuals with “constipation from opioid use 
in adults with chronic non-cancer pain and advanced illness” (Progenics, n.d.). As described in 
court documents, Perez was never directly involved in the clinical trials for Relistor and was not 
involved in “…any sales, marketing, or public relations positions…” (Julio Perez v. Progenics 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2015, p. 1) for the product Relistor. Progenics and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals 
Division partnered together “…to co-develop and jointly commercialize Relistor…[and] 
established a Joint Steering Committee (“JSC”), a Joint Development Committee (“JDC”), and a 
Joint Commercialization Committee (“JCC”)” to assist with the Relistor project (Julio Perez v. 
Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2015, p. 3). According to Perez, Target Product Profiles, which, 
according to a Joint Development Plan, was another creation of both Progenics and Wyeth, had 
an ideal description of the specific concepts of Relistor (Julio Perez v. Progenics 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2015, p. 4). Furthermore, Perez asserted that, while knowing that the 
second phase of testing for Relistor had yielded negative results, Wyeth and Progenics released 
statements to the contrary, saying that the clinical trials had shown positive results (p. 5-6).  
 Per an update from Wyeth, referred to as the “Wyeth Update,” there was a 
recommendation that Relistor not continue forward to phase 3 of clinical testing, but per Wyeth, 
after talks with Progenics, Phase 3 of testing was allowed. This update was sent to certain 
Progenics employees, including senior management and Mark Baker, Progenics’ general 
counsel, and was not intended for Perez, but he somehow attained the update. Perez sent a 
memorandum on August 4, 2008, to Mark Baker and Thomas Boyd, Progenics’ Senior Vice-
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President of Product Development, stating that Progenics was committing an act of fraud since 
by approving Relistor even though the clinical trial results were negative. 
According to Progenics, Perez’s work computer was taken away for two reasons. The 
first reason, was that the he was not one of the original intended recipients of the Wyeth Update 
and thus there was suspicion surround how Perez had received the Wyeth Update. The second 
reason, was that Perez was not in his office at the time Mark Baker came to talk to Perez and 
thus, as a precaution, Perez’s computer was secured (p. 8). Unlike Progenics account of the 
events, Perez stated that “…Baker told him “in hostile words” that his computer had been 
removed and did not make any comment on the Wyeth Update” (p. 8). When questioned by 
“…Robert McKinney, then Progenics Chief Financial Officer…” (p. 9) as to how Perez had 
acquired the Wyeth Update, Perez requested to speak to his attorney first. McKinney agreed to 
this and Perez was told to contact Baker with his answer. However, the next day Perez met with 
both McKinney and Baker and received two letters, the first stating that Perez’s assertions were 
groundless and the second stating that Perez must have gotten the Wyeth Update through some 
type of illegal activity and he would therefore be fired effective immediately.  
 This was not the first-time Perez had dealt with retaliation from Progenics. “On October 
2, 2007, [Perez] filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration…alleging that Progenics failed to promote him in retaliation for raising 
concerns in October 2005 and October 2006 about a different drug Prostate-Specific Membrane 
Antigen Antibody-Drug Conjugate (“PSMA-ADC”)” (p. 10). Following his conversation with 
Baker and McKinney, Perez filed another complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor’s OSHA 
about his termination from Progenics. Like the Menendez v. Halliburton Inc. case, both of 
Perez’s original claims were rejected. Perez, like Menendez, persevered regardless and appealed 
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his complaint about his termination from Progenics on December 23, 2008. Over the next year 
and 11 months, Perez would file a lawsuit against Progenics and filed an Amended Complaint on 
November 29, 2010. Progenics “…filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on February 
8, 2013… [and] the Court held oral argument on June 26, 2013…” (11: 
Defendant makes three main arguments: (1) Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity, 
because he did not “reasonably believe” that the May 2008 Press Release was fraudulent; 
(2) even if Plaintiff engaged in protected activity, Plaintiff cannot show that the protected 
activity was a “contributing factor” to his termination; and (3) Plaintiff’s employment 
would have been terminated even in the absence of the protected activity (15).  
Ultimately, the Court sided with Perez on all three of the above arguments. According to 
the Government Accountability Project, an organization “…created in 1977 at the Institute for 
Policy Studies (IPS) in response to several whistleblowers…” (Government Accountability 
Project, n.d.), Perez was awarded $1,662,951 as compensation for his unlawful termination in 
2015. The Court also, instead of ordering Progenics to reinstate Perez, required Progenics to pay 
Perez $2.7 million in “front pay.” This course of action was determined to be the most favorable 
because “the Court… found Perez had no reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable 
alternative employment. The amount of the award was based on a conservative estimate of 
expected earnings based on Perez’ age at the time of the verdict until a reasonable retirement 
age” (Stinson Leonard Street LLP, 2016). To put this in further perspective, according to Yahoo 
Finance, Progenics gross profit on its 2015 income statement only reached about $8,676,000, 
meaning that over half of Progenics gross profit for 2015 went to compensate Perez (Yahoo 
Finance Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2016).  
The Monsanto Whistleblower 
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 In contrast to the years immediately following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and even 
those following the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, whistleblower complaints 
are starting to be heard more often and, not only heard, but whistleblowers are also starting to 
win with higher payouts in the end. This increase in, not only payout, but overall publicity on 
part of the American news media as well as the SEC itself can be seen in the recent penalty of 
Monsanto Company for its inappropriate accounting methods and misstatements to the public in 
its 2009, 2010, and 2011 annual reports.  
The Monsanto case was, not only successful in bringing a whistleblower claim forward, 
but resulted in millions of dollars in reparations being awarded to the whistleblower. Unlike 
other whistleblower cases however, the whistleblower’s claim originally started as an internal 
claim, but then eventually made its way to the SEC’s doorstep (Cohn, 2016). Also, unlike other 
whistleblower cases where the identity of the whistleblower either was well known from the 
beginning or eventually came to light, the chances of that occurring are almost nonexistent, even 
though the SEC’s initial public announcement about fining Monsanto was announced in 
February 2016. However, according to the Wall Street Journal, the Monsanto whistleblower was 
“a former financial executive…” (Rubenfeld, 2016), but just as was the case of other articles, the 
whistleblower’s exact identity was not revealed. This secrecy covering the Monsanto 
whistleblower’s identity because, “by law, the SEC protects the confidentiality of whistleblowers 
and does not disclose information that might directly or indirectly reveal a whistleblower’s 
identity” (SEC, 2016). 
The whistleblower responsible for bringing forward information to the SEC received “… 
an award of more than $22 million…one of the largest awards so far since the SEC instituted the 
current whistleblower program inaugurated under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010” (Cohn, 2016). 
Harrington 39 
 
To put this in perspective, Monsanto was ordered to pay $80 million to the SEC. This meant that 
the whistleblower received roughly 27.5% of the total Monsanto fine. Officially, the SEC 
investigation looked into the actions of four parties; Monsanto Company, as an entity itself, Sara 
M. Brunnquell, CPA, the former External Reporting Lead at Monsanto and current Global 
Commercial Operations Climate Lead, Jonathan W. Nienas, the former U.S. Strategic Account 
Lead for the Roundup division of Monsanto, and Anthony P. Hartke, the former U.S. Business 
Analyst for Monsanto’s Roundup division and current Regional FP&A Analysis Lead at 
Monsanto (In the Matter of Monsanto Company, Sara M. Brunnquell, CPA, Anthony P. Hartke, 
CPA, and Jonathan W. Nienas, 2016).  
According to the SEC investigation, in regards to Monsanto’s herbicide product, 
Roundup (2016): 
During fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011, Monsanto improperly accounted for millions 
of dollars of rebates offered to Roundup distributors and retailers in the U.S. and Canada 
to incent them to purchase Roundup. Monsanto also improperly accounted for rebate 
payments to Roundup customers in Canada, France, and Germany as selling, general, and 
administrative expenses (“SG&A”) rather than rebates, which boosted Roundup gross 
profit in those countries. Monsanto did not have sufficient internal accounting controls to 
identify and properly account for rebate payments promised to customers (p. 2).  
In short, Monsanto not only had improper accounting methods to keep track of its product, 
Roundup, but also suffered from a deficiency in internal controls in regards to the product, which 
are used to prevent and detect errors or misstatements, whether intentional or unintentional. 
 The report goes on to detail how, starting after the year 2000, Monsanto’s Roundup 
product was not earning its expected annual expectations and Monsanto lost most the market 
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share to products manufactured by other companies. During Monsanto’s fourth quarter of 2009, 
Monsanto created a U.S. Loyalty Bonus program to incentivize retailers to purchase more 
Roundup. This loyalty program was, in part, created with the help of Hartke and approved by 
Brunnquell, which is why the investigation extended to both.  
 The first major departure from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
revolved around the recognition of revenue from the loyalty program. The revenue should have 
been recorded in the 2009 fiscal year, but Monsanto instead recorded it in the 2010 fiscal year (p. 
2). Again, this approval of accounting treatment was given by both Hartke and Brunnquell as 
well as the auditors, Deloitte & Touche LLP. The second major accounting departure was that, 
per an agreement between Nienas and a customer, referred to as “Customer A” in the official 
SEC report, Customer A could record payment of a rebate under the 2010 Rebate program even 
though the Customer had not met target goals for the 2009 loyalty program. This action of 
paying a customer even without the customer meeting the predetermined sales goals was 
repeated with what the SEC referred to as “Customer B.” “Monsanto relied upon the failures of 
Customers A and B to meet their minimum LTA [Long-Term Agreements] volume targets as the 
basis for reversing LTA accruals in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009. Hartke participated in 
recording the reversal of these accruals” (p. 7). This process was repeated for Monsanto’s 2010 
and 2011 fiscal years, thus, affirming the SEC’s allegations that for the years 2009, 2010, and 
2011 Monsanto had improperly accounted for its sales. Also, Monsanto’s internal controls were 
unable to prevent side agreements between Monsanto and the customer that were established 
after the original loyalty program agreement (p. 8). 
 In regards to Monsanto’s Canadian operation, due to the Monsanto U.S. price-drop of 
Roundup, Monsanto was faced with a dilemma. It had established, prior to the price drop, the 
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Price Risk Protection Program, which would have obligated Monsanto to accrue payment 
obligations after the price drop. However, in exchange for the willing consent to relinquish their 
rights to the PRPP, customers were told that “…it would pay them amounts equivalent to the 
amounts payable under the PRPP through a sales incentive program like the U.S. LBP 
(hereinafter “the LBP Canada”)” (p. 9). Brunnquell purposefully misled auditors, telling them 
that many of the, at that point, cancelled accounts were still active. This led to Monsanto Canada 
having “…improperly recorded approximately $43 million in rebates…” (p. 9) for fiscal year 
2010. Furthermore, in 2010, the rebate program was converted to account for rebates into the 
selling, general, and administrative expenses and the Monsanto employees valued these expenses 
and services to reflect $18 million even though this estimate was not accurately represented of 
the fair value of the services. 
 Monsanto France and Germany both faced the same issues. In 2009, Monsanto France 
and Germany had too much left in inventory of their Roundup products. Much like in Monsanto 
Canada during the same period, Monsanto tried to transfer the extra costs into selling, general, 
and administrative accounts because customers were supposed to receive $5 worth of 
compensation for every liter of Roundup that was sold. This plan was carried out from fiscal 
years 2009 to 2011, but the SEC found no evidence that such sales of Roundup on the customer’s 
behalf ever occurred (p. 9-11). Finally, the last charge brought forward is that Monsanto, while 
utilizing irregular accounting methods, also continued its sale of securities, intentionally 
misleading the public (p. 11). 
Discussion & Conclusion 
Shortly after the passage of the SOX Act of 2002, even knowing that protections exist, 
many whistleblowers remain silent, fearing that their claims would not be heard. The two great 
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whistleblowers of the early 2000s, Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper, both faced retaliation 
from both their superiors and corporate America, though, neither one pursued legal action 
against their former employers. Their stories present a double-edged sword to whistleblowers. 
On one hand, by blowing the whistle on a company for some type of illegal activity, they would 
be acting in an ethical manner and would be compensated for their actions. On the other hand, 
should they potentially be retaliated against by their employer and their claim not be held up in 
court, then both the immediate and long-term economic consequences could be devastating. 
Also, even if they were to win the industry they practice in might retaliate in some way against 
the whistleblower, as can be seen in the case of Watkins and Cooper. 
 Even if the whistleblower wins, it could take years for their claims to be upheld, as can be 
seen in the case of Menendez, Lawson, Zang, and Perez. While ultimately these four 
whistleblowers all received compensation for the retaliation they experienced, they also 
experienced a lengthy period between when they were first retaliated against and when they 
received their compensation. This time for each of them, in some way, resulted in some 
economic loss, at least in terms loss of income from their occupation that they left or lost. Also, 
the emotional toll that it this long-waiting period could take on a whistleblower should not be 
overlooked, as it affects a person’s whole life. Thus, while government regulation, in theory, 
does ultimately protect a whistleblower, the complexity of the legal system can present a 
roadblock in the whistleblower’s journey.  
Another interesting note is that government regulation does not provide any provisions 
for reprimanding a company and requiring it to take extra actions to change its tone at the top or 
corporate culture after a whistleblower’s claim is upheld. Each of those responsible for the 
instances of employer retaliation mentioned prior, except for Enron and WorldCom executives, 
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never faced criminal charges. While Halliburton, Inc., FMR LLC, Progenics Inc., and Monsanto 
all faced fines from the whistleblower cases, as stated above, none were forced to necessarily put 
in preventative measures to prevent further instances of whistleblower retaliation. In fact, as 
mentioned in the case of Menendez vs. Halliburton, Inc., some of those who had been directly 
involved in retaliating against Menendez did not face any negative consequences. They remained 
untouched and, in some cases, had been promoted to a higher position. 
One possible solution to further prevent retaliation against whistleblowers in a 
corporation would be some type of punishment. This punishment would need to be two-fold, one 
involving a punishment from the court, such as a fine to those who had retaliated against the 
whistleblower, and some type of punishment on the part of the company. While the combined 
consequences may seem harsh on the surface, this could potentially help to further create a more 
ethical tone at the top while also providing a further deterrent for unethical behavior. This type of 
legislation might also encourage more employees to not be afraid about blowing the whistle. 
In conclusion, whistleblowers come from all types of situations and backgrounds. From a 
staff accountant to the vice president of a company, from reporting a concern internally to 
alerting an outside organization, anyone can be a whistleblower. More importantly, everyone in 
any organization should be willing to be a whistleblower if the need arises. Any employee should 
be empowered by the company itself to blow-the-whistle if they notice something wrong 
happening, even acknowledging that they may potentially face retaliation from fellow employees 
or upper management. The legal battle these whistleblowers face to prove their innocence can be 
just as daunting as the actual act of whistleblowing itself, due to the amount of time it takes for 
some whistleblowers’ claims to be upheld by an upper level court. In the end, while there is 
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federal legislation to protect whistleblowers and whistleblowers’ claims have been validated 
more and more in recent years, many more employees remain afraid to blow the whistle. 
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